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INTRODUCTION
Roughly two hundred organizations are criminally sentenced in federal
court each year.' Although the average sentence requires payment of several
million dollars (roughly $4.5 million in 20052), judges may order organizations
to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and restitution.3 Judges have
typically crafted these multi-million dollar sentences based on provisions of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines pertaining to organizations (the "organizational
guidelines"), 4 but the Supreme Court's most important sentencing decision in
recent years has cast doubt on this process. In United States v. Booker, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the requirement that judges treat the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory when sentencing individuals.' The
Court did not explicitly address the sentencing of organizations; however, a
careful reading of the opinion leads to two conclusions about organizational
sentencing.
First, Booker's broad holding rendered the organizational guidelines, like
the guidelines applicable to individuals (the "individual guidelines"),
nonmandatory. The provision that made the guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553, does not distinguish between the organizational guidelines and the
individual guidelines,6 and the Booker Court invalidated this provision, holding
that the combination of judicial fact-finding and mandatory sentencing
1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (20o6) [hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT] (listing 187 recorded organization sentences in fiscal year 2005). While only 130
organizations were sentenced in 2004, 200 were sentenced in 2003, and 252 in 2002. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2006) [hereinafter 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS io6 tbl.5 2 (2005) [hereinafter 2003 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 96 tbl.52 (2004) [hereinafter 2002
SOURCEBOOK]. All editions of the Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics
can be found at U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Annual Reports and Statistical Sourcebooks,
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
2. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
124 tb. 5 2 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 SOURCEBOOK] (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 342 tbl.5 2
(post-Booker statistics).
3. See, e.g., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 53 (noting that the highest recorded
organizational fine in fiscal year 2004 was $240 million).
4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2005).
5. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b) (2000).
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guidelines violated individual defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.7 Booker's
statutory remedy thereby rendered all of the guidelines nonmandatory.
Second, in addition to sweeping the organizational guidelines under its
statutory remedy, Booker's constitutional reasoning applies to the
organizational guidelines. This conclusion is not immediately obvious. After
Booker, sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional if they direct a judge to find
facts that increase the maximum guideline sentence that can be imposed on the
defendant, thereby robbing him of his right to have those facts found by a
jury. Thus, if a defendant does not have the right to a jury trial, a judge can
presumably sentence him based on mandatory guidelines without running
afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Because of this wrinkle, one might expect that
organizations can still be sentenced under mandatory guidelines -after all, it is
not self-evident that organizations have jury rights.
Nevertheless, based on decisions from lower federal courts, organizations
sentenced under the organizational guidelines -with the possible exception of
large organizations facing relatively modest fines -are entitled to a jury trial.9
Because Booker's Sixth Amendment reasoning therefore will apply to the
organizational guidelines in most cases, Congress cannot restore the guidelines
to mandatory status by a quick statutory fix. Moreover, even if Congress could
constitutionally reinstate the guidelines' mandatory status for those
organizations that are not entitled to a jury trial, it would be unwise to do so as
a policy matter: mandatory guidelines are unable to account for the wide
variety of circumstances surrounding organizational crime and have proven
unnecessary to fulfill the goals for which the guidelines were created.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces Booker and explains that
Booker rendered the organizational guidelines nonmandatory. Part II discusses
the organizational guidelines, including their origin and their operation. Part
III considers the various approaches that courts have taken to determine the
jury rights of organizations and finds that under current law, organizations are
entitled to criminal jury trials in some but not all instances. Part IV concludes
that after Booker the organizational guidelines neither can nor should be
mandatory.
7- 543 U.S. at 244-45, 249.
8. Id. at 244.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 193-201.
io. See infra Section 1V.B.
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I. BOOKER BASICS
Booker was the culmination of a series of Supreme Court cases on
sentencing and jury rights, the most important of which were Apprendi v. New
Jersey" and Blakely v. Washington.12 In Apprendi, the criminal defendant
challenged a hate crime statute that allowed a judge to increase the defendant's
sentence above the statutory maximum based on the judge's own fact-
finding.13 The Supreme Court struck down the statute, holding that it violated
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. 14 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the Court reasoned, required that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."" Because the hate crime statute violated this rule (later known as the
"Apprendi rule"), it was unconstitutional.
Several years later, in Blakely, the Court used the Apprendi rule to strike
down a system of state sentencing guidelines. Blakely had been sentenced
under Washington's sentencing guidelines, which established a narrower range
of sentences a judge could impose for each crime and also set forth aggravating
factors that a judge, based on her own findings, could use to increase
sentences. 6 The Court held that these judge-found aggravating factors violated
the Apprendi rule and thus the Sixth Amendment.17 In reaching this result, the
Court ruled that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.", 8 Because the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, like the Washington guidelines, used judge-found facts to increase
sentences above those that could be imposed based on jury-found facts alone,
Blakely hinted that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines might also violate the Sixth
Amendment.
What Blakely hinted, Booker confirmed. In Booker, the Court concluded that
judges' use of the mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines violated defendants'
11. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
12. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
13. 530 U.S. at 468-69.
14. Id. at 476-77, 497.
15. Id. at 490.
16. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300.
17. Id. at 304-08.
18. Id. at 303.
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Sixth Amendment rights. ' 9 After Apprendi and Blakely, the prosecution bore the
burden of proving to a jury any fact (other than a prior conviction) that would
increase the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum." Because
the sentencing guidelines generally instructed judges to find facts themselves
and to use those facts to impose higher sentences than could be imposed based
on jury-found facts alone,2" the Booker Court declared unconstitutional the
combination of judicial fact-finding and mandatory sentencing guidelines."
To remedy the guidelines' constitutional woes, the Court excised two
statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 3 55 3 (b)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 3 The
latter provision set forth standards for review of sentences on appeal;14 the
former required judges to follow the guidelines' sentencing recommendation
absent a special justification for departure . 2 Thus, the excision of § 3 55 3 (b)(1)
means that judges are no longer bound to implement the guidelines.2
6
Because Booker involved the sentencing of an individual defendant, the
question remains whether the Court's remedy extends to the organizational
guidelines. The answer is plainly yes. Although the organizational guidelines
were created separately and operate differently than the individual guidelines, 7
§ 35 53 (b)(1) does not distinguish between the two. It refers only to "the
sentencing guidelines.""S Thus, when Booker declared § 3 55 3 (b)(1) invalid, all
of the sentencing guidelines became nonmandatory. Furthermore, Justice
Breyer emphasized that this result was not merely an accident of the statute,
but also reflected the Court's refusal to leave in place a dual system of
guidelines:
[W]e do not see how it is possible to leave the Guidelines as binding in
other cases.... [W]e believe that Congress would not have authorized
a mandatory system in some cases and a nonmandatory system in
others, given the administrative complexities that such a system would
19. 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
2o. Id. at 244. In addition, the Court acknowledged that an increase in sentence would be
appropriate when the defendant had admitted to the facts supporting such an increase. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
22. 543 U.S. at 244.
23. Id. at 245, 259.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).
25. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3 55 3 (b)(1) (West Supp. 2006).
26. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
27. See infra Section II.C.
28. 18 U.S.C.A. S 3553(b)().
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create. Such a two-system proposal seems unlikely to further Congress'
basic objective of promoting uniformity in sentencing.29
This language eliminates any, remaining uncertainty about Booker's
applicability to the organizational guidelines.
Since Booker, courts seem simply to have taken this result for granted,
treating organizational sentencing no differently than individual sentencing."0
To date, only one federal court has expressly considered how Booker affected
the organizational guidelines. In United States v. Yang, the Sixth Circuit first
considered whether the corporation had a right to a jury trial, and it concluded
that the $2 million fine at issue indicated that the charged crime was
sufficiently "serious" to entitle the corporation to a jury trial.31 The court then
applied Booker to hold that the corporation had been denied a constitutional
right when it was sentenced based on judge-found facts in combination with
mandatory organizational guidelines.32
Of course, the statutory remedy in Booker made Yang's analysis
unnecessary; the guidelines were not mandatory regardless of whether the
defendant was entitled to a jury trial. Nonetheless, the Yang analysis remains
relevant to the larger assessment of post-Booker organizational sentencing.
Although § 3553 (b)(1) is excised for the time being, Congress could attempt to
resurrect some version of it in the future,33 in which case courts would be
obliged to assess whether mandatory organizational guidelines violate
defendant organizations' constitutional right to a jury trial. This Note aims to
make that determination and to illustrate why the organizational guidelines
should remain nonmandatory.
29. Booker, 543 U.S. at 266-67.
30. See United States v. Patient Transfer Serv., Inc., 413 F. 3d 734 (8th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2005).
31. 144 F. App'x 521, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2005); see also infra text accompanying notes 171-172. For
further discussion of the role of a crime's "seriousness" in determining when a defendant
has a right to a jury trial, see infra Subsection III.B.1.
32. Yang, 144 F. App'x at 524.
33. Indeed, Congress has already begun to consider legislation that may change the weight that
judges must give the guidelines in sentencing determinations. See, e.g., United States v.
Booker: One Year Later- Chaos or Status Quo?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 23 (2006)
[hereinafter Booker Hearing] (statement of William W. Mercer, United States Attorney for
the District of Montana), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/
lo9th/26647.pdf.
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II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Criminal prosecution and sentencing of organizations have changed greatly
in the last century. One hundred years ago, it was unclear whether an
organization could even be convicted of a crime. Until roughly twenty years
ago, organizations were sentenced under the same standards as individuals.
Then, fifteen years ago, the organizational guidelines became the benchmark
for sentencing organizations. This Part traces these developments and
describes how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have changed organizational
sentencing.
A. Convicting Organizations of Crimes
Today, corporations and other organizations can be convicted of crimes
based on their agents' conduct, but they have not always been so liable. Under
the English common law, corporations could not be convicted of crimes,34 and
the same held true during the first hundred years of the United States'
existence.3" The primary rationale for exempting the corporation from criminal
liability was its artificiality. As William Blackstone wrote, "[Its] existence being
ideal, no man can apprehend or arrest it."' 36 It was thought that a corporation
had "no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked."37 As corporations began
to grow in importance during the late nineteenth century, however, the law
increasingly regarded them as real rather than artificial entities, and the
government took a greater interest in regulating them.
The Supreme Court first upheld Congress's imposition of criminal
penalties on corporations in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v.
United StatesO8 by extending the tort doctrine of respondeat superior-the
34. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (19o9) ("Some of
the earlier writers on common law held the law to be that a corporation could not commit a
crime."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIJES *464-65. But see Frederick Pollock, Has
the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?, 27 LAW Q. REV. 219, 232 (1911)
("[T]here was no settled rule either way ....").
35. See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV.
793, 8o8-o (1996) (describing how, in the mid-nineteenth century, states first began
experimenting with corporate criminal liability).
36. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *465.
37. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (attributing this remark
to Lord Chancellor Thurlow).
38. 212 U.S. 481.
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theory that "the corporation may be held responsible for damages for the acts
of its agent within the scope of his employment."39 In the decades since, federal
courts have refined New York Central's standard of corporate vicarious liability
into its current form and expanded it to apply to all organizations. Today, an
organization may be held liable for crimes that its agent commits within the
scope of his authority (or apparent authority) and with the intent to benefit the
organization. 4° The "benefit" threshold is quite low: an agent intends to
"benefit" his organization as long as he is at least partially motivated by the
interests of the organization, even if his conduct harms the organization or
contravenes its policies or explicit instruction.41 Accordingly, an organization is
legally responsible for many of its agents' crimes, even if the government
declines to press charges against it.
4
B. The Statutory Background of the Organizational Guidelines
The history of the organizational guidelines begins in 1984 with the
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act.43 The Reform Act had two independent
effects on organizational sentencing. First, it created the United States
Sentencing Commission, 44 which promulgated guidelines to direct federal
sentencing and produced the organizational guidelines seven years after its
creation. 41 Second, it created a new statutory system of organizational fines,
increasing all criminal fines for organizations and distinguishing between
individual and organizational penalties to a degree uncommon in earlier law.46
39. Id. at 493.
40. See United States v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 77o F.2d 399, 406-08 (4 th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982); see also EUGENE M. PROPPER,
CORPORATE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 1 (2000) (explaining this
liability standard).
41. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
affd, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); see also United States v. Basic Constr., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4 th Cir.
1983) (allowing for imputation when an employee acted for the benefit of the corporation,
even if his conduct was against corporate policy or instructions).
42. For discussion of the exercise of this prosecutorial discretion, see infra text accompanying
note 221.
43. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 5§ 3551-3673 (2000) and 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000)).
44. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994-995.
45. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR
ORGANIZATIONS (1991), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/OrgGL83o91.pdf
[hereinafter Supp. REPORT].
46. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553, 3571-3572.
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This new regime of organizational fines sought to correct a system that was
widely perceived as weak and unfair. Prior to the Reform Act, federal law
usually applied the same fines-typically no more than a few thousand
dollars -to all offenders, whether individuals, mom-and-pop firms, or major
multinational corporations. 47 Accordingly, fines were low enough for large
corporations to safely ignore them, giving them an incentive to commit crimes
if doing so offered a chance of significant profit. 48 The Reform Act attempted
to remove these incentives by significantly increasing the maximum fines that
organizations faced. 49 For instance, prior to 1984, an organization faced a fine
of no more than $1000 for each count of felony mail fraud."0 After the passage
of the Reform Act and related, legislation, all felonies committed by
organizations carried a potential fine of at least $500,000.1 Mean fines more
than doubled,"2 and eventually the total sanctions against firms-now
averaging in the hundreds of thousands of dollars-became roughly equal to
the monetary harm caused. s3
The Reform Act also created the statutory framework upon which the
Sentencing Commission eventually built the organizational guidelines. Under
this framework, an "organization" is defined as any "person other than an
individual, '" 4 including "corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock
companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations,
governments . . . and non-profit organizations.""5 A court can sentence an
47. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 103-05 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3286-88
(presenting a report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, of which the Sentencing Reform Act was a part; describing the typical
felony as punishable by "a maximum fine of only $5,ooo or $lo,ooo"; and providing
various examples of low and inconsistent fines).
48. See, e.g., id. at io6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3289.
49. See id. at 104, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3287.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
51. Misdemeanors resulting in death could also be punished by fines up to $500,000.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, ch. C, 98 Stat. 1987, 1995-97
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000)). The Reform Act set fines for individuals at no more
than $250,000. Id.
52. Mean fines rose from $45,790 to $102,469, and mean total sanctions rose from $115,540 to
$356,080. Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice
in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 257 tbl. 3 (1991). These differences are
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Id.
53. See id. at 257 ("The increase in median total sanction multiples [defined as the ratio of total
sanctions to monetary harm] from 0.46 to i.oo . . . is significant at the ninety percent
level.").
54. 18 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
55. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8Ai.i cmt. 1 (2005).
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organization to a fine or to probation; it can sanction the organization with
forfeiture, restitution, or an order to notify victims; or it can combine any of
these punishments. s6 Fines imposed on an organization may be no more than
the greatest of: (1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense; (2)
twice the gross gain to the organization; (3) twice the gross loss to its victims;
and (4) $500,000 for a felony (or misdemeanor resulting in death), $200,000
for a class A misdemeanor, or $1o,ooo for a class B or C misdemeanor or lesser
offense. 7 Thus, unless specially exempted, 8 every felony committed by an
organization can be punished by a fine of at least $Soo,ooo, and the fine may
be far greater depending on the type of offense and the amount of loss or gain
it caused. 9
Several statutory provisions taken together describe how courts must
determine the appropriate sentence for an organization. The most important of
these provisions is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which sets forth a variety of relevant
factors, such as "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant, ''6o that judges must take into account
during sentencing. Before Booker, because § 3553(b) required judges to impose
a sentence within the guideline range unless they found an aggravating or
mitigating factor "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission,"61 judges sentencing organizations (and individuals) generally
ignored § 3553(a)'s factors.62 Since Booker weakened the guidelines'
predominance by making them advisory, § 3553(a) has once again become
integral to sentencing.
6 3
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c). The same punishments, except for imprisonment and death, are
prescribed for individuals.
57. Id. § 3571(c)-(d). Courts must not use measures of gain or loss to determine the sentence if
doing so would "unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process." Id. § 3571(d).
s8. If a statute criminalizing an offense specifically exempts the offense from this standard, then
the sentencing range in that statute is used. Id. § 3571(e).
s9. For example, organizations can be fined up to $1oo million for antitrust offenses even
absent evidence of loss or gain. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 3(a) (West. Supp. 2006); see also United
States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding the use of the § 3571
maximum in place of the maximum given in the statute setting forth the offense).
6o. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(i). This provision is applicable to organizations under § 3551(c). A
related section contains a separate list of factors to be used when setting a fine. Id. § 3572.
61. Id. § 3553(b).
62. Judges generally adhered to this practice except when the guidelines did not fully apply. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.1 & cmt. (2005) (exempting certain types of
crime- such as environmental crimes and violations of the food and drug laws- from the
organizational guidelines' fine calculations but not from the other aspects of the guidelines).
63. 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005).
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C. How Courts Use the Guidelines To Sentence Organizations
At the same time that Congress was fine-tuning its statutory framework for
sentencing organizations, the Sentencing Commission, which had published
individual sentencing guidelines in 1987,64 turned its attention to creating
organizational sentencing guidelines. During the drafting process, the business
community argued that the guidelines should be nonbinding "policy
statements," rather than mandatory rules, because of the complexity of
organizational sentencing and the absence of a sound empirical basis for setting
the fine levels."5 The Commission disagreed, asserting that mandatory
guidelines were necessary to fulfill Congress's mandate of bringing greater
certainty and consistency to all areas of sentencing. 66 Moreover, Commission
members argued, the organizational guidelines gave judges broader sentencing
ranges than did the individual guidelines, allowing judges sufficient flexibility
to account for unusual or complex aspects of organizational sentencing.67 Some
Commission members also believed that only mandatory guidelines would
encourage organizations to take institutional steps to prevent employee
crime. 6' Thus, the organizational guidelines were mandatory when
promulgated in 1991,69 and they remained mandatory and largely unchanged
until Booker.
Under these guidelines, a judge determines an organization's sentence by
beginning with a "base fine," which is then adjusted using a "culpability
score."7 To calculate the base fine, a judge first looks to the offense level of the
crime, as established by chapter two of the sentencing guidelines." The judge
then refers to the "Offense Level Fine Table" in chapter eight, which gives a
corresponding fine for each offense level: an offense level of six, for instance,
corresponds to a maximum $5000 fine, while a level thirty offense corresponds
64. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS (1987).
65. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations:
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 2o5, 240-41 (1993).
66. See SuPP. REPORT, supra note 45, at 6-7; Nagel & Swenson, supra note 65, at 241-44.
67. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 65, at 241-44.
68. See id. at 243-44; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc ADVISORY
GROUP ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 15 (2003) [hereinafter AD Hoc
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG-FINAL.pdf.
69. Supp. REPORT, supra note 45, at 8.
70. Id. at 5-6.
71. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.3 (2005). The judge also groups multiple
counts together in accordance with chapter three, part D.
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to a maximum $1o. 5 million fine.72 The judge then compares this amount with
the organization's pecuniary gain from the offense and the loss caused by the
offense.73 The greatest of the three is the base fine.
74
The culpability score is based, inter alia, on the organization's prior history,
whether upper-level personnel tolerated or were involved in the crime, whether
the organization cooperated with the government and accepted responsibility,
and whether the organization had an "effective compliance and ethics
program" designed to prevent employee wrongdoing.7 An organization's
culpability score in turn determines a minimum and maximum multiplier: the
highest multiplier range (corresponding to the highest culpability score) is
2.00 to 4.oo, and the lowest range is o.o5 to 0.20.76 The judge multiplies the
base fine by each of these multipliers, yielding a fine range.' The
organizational guidelines, for example, would direct a judge to sentence an
organization facing a base fine of $20,ooo and with a culpability score of 5 (and
a corresponding multiplier range of 1.oo to 2.00) to a fine between $20,000
and $40,000. The organizational guidelines also direct the judge to depart
upward or downward from the recommended sentencing range in certain
special circumstances, including when the organization would be unable to pay
the fine imposed.78 In addition to fines, the guidelines direct the judge to
impose restitution, probation, disgorgement, and other remedies as required to
compensate the organization's victims and to prevent a recurrence of the
crime.79
Given the complexity of the organizational guidelines, judges generally
require a great deal of information to apply them. Much of this information is
72. Id. § 8C2.4(d).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4.
75. Id. § 8C2.5.
76. Id. § 8C2.6.
77. Id. 8C2.7.
78. For example, a judge may depart downward if the defendant gave substantial assistance to
the authorities, or she may depart upward if the defendant's crime risked death or posed a
threat to national security, the environment, or the integrity of a market. See id. §§ 8C4 .1-.5.
A judge may also reduce a fine that would impair the organization's ability to make
restitution to its victims or that would "substantially jeopardiz[e] the continued viability of
the organization." Id. § 8C3.3. In addition, she may reduce the fine if an individual who
"owns at least a S percent interest in the organization... has been fined in a federal criminal
proceeding for the same offense conduct" (to avoid punishing the owner of a closely held
firm twice for the same offense). Id. § 8C3.4 .
79. Id. §§ 8B1.1-.3, 8C2.9, 81)1.1.
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provided by the presentence report."' If the judge requires more information to
impose a sentence, she can order further study of the defendant by a qualified
consultant.8 ' Judges can also gain the necessary information through the
sentencing hearing. 8 Thus, the organizational guidelines, like the individual
guidelines, rely heavily on judge-found facts in their operation.
D. Organizational Sentencing Statistics
The Commission publishes annual statistics of organizational sentences.
Although these statistics are imperfect, 8, they provide a useful overview of how
the guidelines have functioned.
From 199384 to 2005, at least 2411 organizations were sentenced in federal
courts.8 , In fiscal year 2o0586 -a fairly typical year - 187 organizations were
sentenced. s (In comparison, 72,462 individuals were sentenced in federal court
in 2005.88) More than 90% of these organizations pled guilty, and more than
8o. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 2(c)-(d). A probation officer conducts the
presentence investigation. After the investigation, he is required to submit a report
containing a provisional calculation of the defendant's sentencing range under the
guidelines and sufficient information for the judge to make the guidelines calculation
herself. FED. R. C~UM. P. 32(C)-(d).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3 55 2(b).
82. See FED. R. CIUM P. 32(i). During the sentencing hearing, either party may object to the
presentencing report and offer evidence to support or rebut such objections. Id. 3 2(i) (2).
83. See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 25; see also Cindy R. Alexander et al., Evaluating
Trends in Corporate Sentencing: How Reliable Are the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Data?, 13
FED. SENT'G REP. io8 (2000) (describing how various omissions in the Commission's data
may cause its statistics to misrepresent organizational sentencing).
84. The Commission did not begin publishing detailed organizational sentencing data until
1993. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 25 n.96.
85. See id. at 25 (noting that 1642 organizations were sentenced from 1993 to 2001); see also
sources and figures cited supra note i (noting the number of organizations sentenced
between 2002 and 2005). This figure probably omits a significant number of cases,
including a disproportionate number of cases with high fines. See Alexander et al., supra
note 83.
86. Fiscal year 2005 is the most recent year for which the Commission has published
organizational data. See sources cited supra note 1. For the purposes of Commission data, a
fiscal year runs from October i to September 30. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at ii-vi.
87. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 124 tbl. 52 (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 342 tbl.52 (post-
Booker statistics).
88. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
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30% had their sentences reduced because they were unable to pay."9
Approximately 56.7% paid only a fine, 16.6% paid only restitution, 17.6% paid
both, and 9% paid neither. 90 The mean fine imposed was roughly $4.86
million, and the median was over $8o,ooo-a huge increase over pre-
guidelines fines, which averaged roughly $1oo,ooo. 92 Additionally, more than
6o% of organizations were subject to some form of probation.
93
Over 90% of sentenced organizations are commercial businesses,94 the
majority of which are small, closely held corporations. 9s In 2001, for instance,
roughly 27.5% of organizations sentenced had lo or fewer employees, 66.4%
had 5o or fewer, 77.2% had ioo or fewer, and only 7.4% had looO or more. 96
Given that the vast majority of U.S. businesses have fewer than 1oo0
employees, this fact is unsurprising.9 Small organizations may also be less able
to conceal crimes or to avoid or defend against criminal charges. 98 Moreover, in
small organizations criminal wrongdoing is less likely to go completely
unobserved by upper-level personnel than in large corporations.
The guidelines' fine levels are not used in a significant number of cases. To
begin with, the guidelines apply only to felonies and class A misdemeanors, 99
and the Commission has provided specific exemptions for certain types of
89. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 125 tbl.5 3 (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 343 tbl.53 (post-
Booker statistics).
go. Id. at 123 tbl. 51 (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 341 tbl. 5i (post-Booker statistics).
gi. See sources cited supra note 87, excluding cases in which no fine was imposed because the
organization lacked the ability to pay. These numbers may underestimate current fines. See
Alexander et al., supra note 83, at 1O8.
92. Cohen, supra note 52, at 256-57.
93. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 125 tbl. 53 (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 343 tbl. 53 (post-
Booker statistics).
94. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting
Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REv. 697, 709-10 (2002). These numbers only cover
sentencing through 2000 and are incomplete, as courts did not always report to the
Commission the type of organization sentenced. Id.
95. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 26.
96. Id. The 2005 Sourcebook does not specifically indicate the sizes of the sentenced
organizations, although table 54's summary of culpability scores suggests that organizational
size in 2005 followed the pattern of previous years. See 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at
126 tbl.54 (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 344 tbl.54 (post-Booker statistics).
97. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 26.
98. See Nicole Leeper Piquero & Jason L. Davis, Extralegal Factors and the Sentencing of
Organizational Defendants: An Examination of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 32 J. CRiM.
JUST. 643, 646 (2004).
99. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.9 (2005); Supp. REPORT, supra note 45, at 7.
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common crimes.' 00  For instance, in 2005 more than one-quarter of
organizational sentences were for environmental crimes," ' an offense category
excluded from the guidelines' fines.' °2  Similarly, the three highest
organizational fines of 2005 ($185 million, $16o million, and $84 million) were
for antitrust offenses,"°3 which are subject to their own modified fine
calculation under the guidelines.10 4 Fraud, however, is the most common
organizational offense (constituting 27.8% of sentences in 2005),"' and the
guidelines' basic fine system does apply to fraud cases. 1° 6
In short, although every year the organizational guidelines are used to
impose substantial fines on large corporations, such cases are exceptional.
Instead, the typical defendant sentenced under the organizational guidelines is
a small business that defrauded its customers or investors and now stands near
the brink of bankruptcy.
III. AN ORGANIZATION'S RIGHT TO A CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL
When the Sentencing Commission created the organizational guidelines, it
did not consider the constitutional rights of organizations.10 7 In the wake of
Booker, however, the Sixth Amendment rights of organizations may determine
the future of the guidelines. Because Booker's holding was tied directly to the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right, Congress' ability to resurrect the
guidelines to mandatory status depends upon whether organizations have any
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
loo. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.1.
101. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 123 tbl. 51 (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 341 tbl. 51 (post-
Booker statistics); see Paula Desio, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, An Overview of the
Organizational Guidelines, http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited
Nov. 13, 20o6) ("The most commonly occurring offenses (in order of decreasing frequency)
are fraud, environmental waste discharge, tax offenses, antitrust offenses, and food and
drug violations.").
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.1.
103. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 43, 51.
104. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2R1.1.
105. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 123 tbl.5 l (pre-Booker statistics); id. at 341 tbl. 5i (post-
Booker statistics).
o6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.I.
1o7. See, e.g., Sup. REPORT, supra note 45, at 5-15 (lacking discussion of constitutional issues
among the "Major Issues in Drafting Organizational Guidelines").
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A. Do Organizations Possess Constitutional Rights?
When the Constitution was ratified, corporations and other organizations
essentially had no constitutional rights. Over time, however, courts came to
treat corporations more like individuals, not only making them subject to
criminal liability, '  but also extending to them some constitutional
protections. Today, organizations enjoy many (but not all) of the same rights
as individuals.
The common law was not sympathetic to corporate rights, and rights for
other organizations were practically nonexistent. The corporation was merely a
label that allowed a group of persons, contractually bound to one another and
to the state via their charter, to organize more easily and to pass property and
privileges more readily from generation to generation."0 9 As a legal "person,"
the corporation possessed only the rights to own property, to sue and be sued,
and to enter into contracts."' Otherwise, its legal capacity was limited." This
restricted view of corporate rights continued to dominate American law
throughout most of the nineteenth century.' 2 Not until the United States was
industrializing and the corporation was growing in importance did courts
begin to take corporate constitutional rights seriously.
Hale v. Henkel"' was a milestone in the development of corporate rights. In
Hale, the Court addressed whether a corporation possessed a Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures or a Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Interestingly, the
Court treated these two inquiries very differently. It recognized a corporate
right against unreasonable searches and seizures by a "pass-through" analysis,
whereby the corporation assumed the rights of the individuals composing it."4
With regard to the corporation's claimed right against self-incrimination,
however, the Court held that "a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises, may [not] refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of
ios. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
iog. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *464 (stating that a corporation is "invisible, and
existing only in the intendment and consideration of law").
11o. Id. at *463.
mii. See id. at *464.
112. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636, 642 (1819)
(holding that a corporation is a "mere creature of the law ... possess[ing] only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it" but that "[t~he corporation is
the assignee of [its members' or creators'] rights [and] stands in their place").
113. 201 U.S. 43 (19o6).
114. Id. at 76.
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such privileges.'... Thus, whereas numerous constitutional rights flowed from
a corporation's owners to the corporation itself, the unique nature of the
corporation-its ability to pool assets, act collectively, and perhaps conceal
information -prevented the right against self-incrimination from so flowing.
In the century since Hale, the Court has continued to develop its
jurisprudence of corporate constitutional rights and has expanded this
jurisprudence to reach other types of organizations. ' 6 Rather than trace this
entire history in detail, a brief outline of the major organizational rights as they
stand today will suffice.' 7 First, organizations are "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment." 8 Accordingly, their rights to due process, just
compensation, equal protection, ' a civil jury trial, 2' protection against double
jeopardy,"' and protection from excessive fines.2 appear to be the same as
those of any natural person. Second, although the Court has suggested that
organizations generally enjoy the same freedoms of speech" 3 and press '14 as
individuals, this suggestion does not apply to campaign-related corporate
115. Id. at 75.
116. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) ("Long ago this Court recognized
that the economic rights of an individual may depend for the effectiveness of their
enforcement on rights in the group, even though not formally corporate, to which he
belongs.").
117. For more extensive discussion of the constitutional rights of corporations and organizations,
see Henning, supra note 35; Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the
Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (199o); and Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate
Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641 (1982).
1i8. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 78o n.15 (1978) ("It has been settled for
almost a century that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
119. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
iao. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (holding that stockholders in a derivative
action had a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because " [t] he corporation,
had it sued on its own behalf, would have been entitled to a jury's determination").
121. Cf United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962). The Court did not directly address the issue of double
jeopardy in either case; it seemingly took for granted that corporations receive the same
double jeopardy protection as individuals.
122. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (recognizing
that punitive damages imposed on a corporation may violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of "excessive fines").
123. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 ("We thus find no support ... for the proposition that speech
that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection
simply because its source is a corporation ....").
124. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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speech, which Congress can regulate more freely than the political speech of
individuals.12 s Third, organizations are protected against unreasonable searches
and seizures, but not to the same extent as individuals because organizations
are presumed to have lower expectations of privacy. 26 Finally, under the
"collective entity rule," organizations generally have no protection whatsoever
against compulsory self-incrimination.127
Although the Court has never fully synthesized its organizational rights
jurisprudence, the following generalizations may be drawn. Organizations
usually have the same constitutional rights as individuals. They may have a
particular right because it is necessary to protect the rights of the individuals in
the organization (the "pass-through" rationale)1" 8 or because giving the
organization such a right protects something else of independent social or
constitutional value (for example, the free flow of information safeguarded by
the First Amendment). 9 There are, however, several exceptions."' First,
organizations do not receive the protections of rights that are "purely
personal," that is, rights "the 'historic function' of [which] has been limited to
the protection of individuals." 3' This is a potential rationale behind limiting an
organization's privacy rights. Second, organizations do not receive the
protection of a right when granting such protection would significantly
undermine the government's ability to enforce the law. This may be one reason
that organizations lack a right against self-incrimination." 2  Third,
125. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) ("We have repeatedly sustained legislation
aimed at the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) ("[C]orporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.").
127. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-09 (1988) (describing the development of
the collective entity rule).
128. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952).
129. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) ("The proper
question therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so,
whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be
whether [the law in question] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect.").
13o. The Court has left itself room to create more exceptions as needed. See id. at 778 n.14
(noting that a particular guarantee may be "unavailable to corporations for some other
reason").
131. Id. Whether the right is available to a corporation is determined by looking to the "nature,
history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision." Id.
132. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944) ("[T]he power to compel the
production of the records of any organization... arises out of the inherent and necessary
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organizations do not receive a right that would give them and their managers
an unfair advantage over individuals. This principle is demonstrated by the
Court's limitation of a corporation's right to campaign-related speech.'33
Although this framework may encapsulate many of the Court's decisions, it
can be difficult to apply. Thus, even a century after the Court's decision in
Hale, the bounds of many organizational rights, including organizational jury
rights, remain vague.
B. Does the Sixth Amendment Entitle Organizations to a Criminal Jury Trial?
As recently as 1994, the law was unclear as to whether organizations were
ever entitled to a criminal jury trial. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits both had
held, without explanation, that organizations were entitled to jury trials, 4 but
the Supreme Court had never decided the question. 3 ' Then, in International
Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, the Supreme Court held that the
defendant, a labor union, had the right to a criminal jury trial.'3 6 The Court,
however, declined to create any test for precisely when organizations would be
entitled to a jury.'37 This Section explores the Court's jurisprudence on jury
rights and the lower courts' attempts to adapt it to organizations.
1. All Defendants Are Entitled to a Jury When Charged with a Serious
Crime
Despite the Constitution's apparent guarantee of a jury right in every
criminal case, 38 courts have long restricted the right to a jury trial to those
power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws .... ); see also Henning,
supra note 35, at 797 ("A corporate right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination
could completely frustrate the criminal prosecution of corporate wrongdoing .. ").
133. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003).
134. See United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934, 935 n.1 (4 th Cir. 1982) ("A
corporation does not have the same right not to incriminate itself as does a natural person,
but it does enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury."); United States v. R.L. Polk
& Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971) (acknowledging "the fundamental principle that
corporations enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury").
135. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (declining to decide whether organizations
are ever entitled to a criminal jury trial).
136. 512 U.S. 821, 837 n.5, 838 (1994).
137. Id. at 837 n.5.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury ....); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . .
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defendants accused of "serious" crimes.'39 The original ground for this
distinction was the common law, which had allowed certain crimes to be tried
by justices of the peace, 14' but this common law standard fell into disfavor by
the early twentieth century. Instead, the Supreme Court began looking to "the
severity of the [statutory maximum] penalty" for a crime to determine whether
the crime was "serious." 14 ' The Court, however, failed to set any standard to
guide this inquiry until 1966. In Cheff v. Schnackenberg,142 the Court adopted
the definition of "petty" crime then used in 18 U.S.C. § x-"[a]ny
misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both"' 43- to hold that
a defendant given a six-month sentence for criminal contempt was not entitled
to a jury because the charged crime was not serious.' 44
Two years later, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 45 the Court abandoned its reliance
on 18 U.S.C. § i's definition of "petty." Although it did not settle "the exact
location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes," it held that a
crime punishable by two years in prison was sufficiently serious to merit a jury
trial.146 In Baldwin v. New York,147 the Court did draw the line, ruling that the
"near-uniform judgment of the Nation" was that a defendant was entitled to a
criminal jury trial when his potential sentence exceeded six months in
prison.14 8 This six-month rule remains the standard today, 49 although a
139. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888) ("The third article of the Constitution
provides for a jury in the trial of 'all crimes, except in cases of impeachment.' The word
'crime,' in its more extended sense, comprehends every violation of public law; in a limited
sense, it embraces offences of a serious or atrocious character.").
140. See id. at 552-53.
141. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937).
142. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 19, 3571 (2000)).
144. Cheff, 384 U.S. at 379-8o. In contempt cases, statutory law typically sets the maximum
penalty. When there is no statutory maximum, the Supreme Court has held that a court
should look to the penalty actually imposed in determining whether the charged offense was
serious or petty. See, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 5o6, 511 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969);
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968); Cheff, 384 U.S. 373.
145. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
146. Id. at 161.
147. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
148. Id. at 72-73.
149. See, e.g., Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 512 ("[O]ur decisions have established a fixed dividing line
between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more than six
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defendant facing a statutory maximum sentence of six months or less may be
entitled to a jury trial in certain instances.'
2. When a Charge Against an Organization Is Serious
This lack of clarity in establishing an individual's right to a jury trial
complicates the task of discerning when organizations are entitled to a jury.
Organizations, of course, are never subject to imprisonment-only fines,
restitution, forfeiture, notice to victims, and probation. ' Thus, courts cannot
rely on the six-month rule to determine whether an organization has a right to
a jury trial. Instead, courts must identify other criteria to determine whether
the maximum statutory fine the organization faces is "serious."
Because the six-month rule was originally based on 18 U.S.C. § i's
definition of a petty offense, using § i might seem to be a good way to decide
when offenses committed by organizations are petty."5 2 The Court, however,
rejected this option in Muniz v. Hoffman.'53 Muniz involved a 13,ooo-member
labor union charged with criminal contempt and facing a $1o,ooo fine.'5 4 At
the time, § 1 set the maximum fine for a petty offense at $5oo,"' and the Court
concluded that "it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a $5oi fine
would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union. ,,
6
months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty
crimes.").
1so. See Blanton v. City ofN. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1989).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(C) (2000).
152. An alternative to using the statutory definition of a petty crime would be to look to state
practice. After all, the Court ultimately justified its six-month line for individual
imprisonment on that basis, see Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69-72, and the Court suggested in
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544-45, that state practice was relevant to determining when fines were
serious. Unfortunately, this approach is a dead end. Not a single state appellate court has
decided when organizations are entitled to a jury trial, and only one has seriously discussed
the question. See Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev. v. Deka Realty Corp., 620 N.Y.S.2d 837, 843-
46 (App. Div. 1995) (discussing several federal cases on organizational jury rights before
concluding that the defendant corporation had waived any jury trial right it might have
possessed).
153. 422 U.S. 454, 476-77 (1975).
154. Id. at 477. Courts usually look to the statutory maximum penalty to determine whether a
crime is "serious." Because Muniz involved contempt charges, however, the Court instead
used $io,ooo, the fine actually imposed. See supra note 144.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3571 (2000)).
156. Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477.
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Indeed, given the union's immense size and resources, even the $10,OOO fine
was not so serious as to require a jury trial."57
In addition to abandoning reliance on § 1, Muniz also suggested a subtle
shift in the Court's approach to seriousness, at least for organizations. Prior to
Muniz, a "serious" crime was one that society (as reflected by Congress) viewed
as serious: a statutory maximum sentence of over six months simply indicated
that society found the crime serious. ,8 In Muniz, the Court viewed seriousness
from the defendant's perspective rather than that of Congress or society: a crime
was serious if the defendant could reasonably view the potential sentence as a
serious deprivation. 59 Under the former approach, the identity and resources
of a particular defendant are irrelevant. Under the latter approach, they may be
decisive.
Ironically, the Court provided no guidance regarding the meaning of
seriousness in International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 60 the only
case in which it has explicitly recognized an organization's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. Like Muniz, Bagwell involved contempt sanctions against a
labor union.' 6' The fines at issue in Bagwell, however, were considerably higher
than the $1o,ooo at issue in Muniz: a penalty of over $64 million was initially
levied and was later reduced to $52 million. 62 The Court recognized that this
amount was serious, but it failed to give any guidance on how this
determination should be made in future borderline cases: "We need not
answer today the difficult question where the line between petty and serious
contempt fines should be drawn, since a $52 million fine unquestionably is a
serious contempt sanction. ',, 63 Thus, Bagwell established that organizations
have a right to a jury trial in at least some circumstances but gave no indication
of how far this right extends.
157. Id. After Muniz, Congress amended the definition of a "petty" crime to include all crimes
with a potential fine of no more than $5ooo for an individual or $1o,ooo for an
organization. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 8, 98 Stat. 3134,
3138 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 19). In one case, the Court suggested that it might
use this amended definition to determine the petty/serious threshold. Blanton, 489 U.S. at
544-45-
158. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1937) (discussing
Congress's judgment of appropriateness in sentencing).
159. 422 U.S. at 477.
16o. 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
16l. Id. at 823.
162. Id. at 824, 837. Because Bagwell was a contempt case, the Court again looked to the fine
imposed, rather than to the statutory maximum fine, to determine seriousness. See supra
note 144.
163. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838 n.5.
654
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:632 20o6
SENTENCING ORGANIZATIONS AFTER BOOKER
Despite this uncertainty, the decision in Bagwell coincides with the Court's
overall organizational rights jurisprudence. As discussed above, the Court has
granted rights to organizations for two reasons: (1) to protect something of
independent social or constitutional value, and (2) to protect the rights of
individuals within organizations.164 Granting organizations a right to a jury
provides something of independent constitutional value: a general safeguard
against government oppression.6 In addition, granting jury rights to
organizations may also be necessary to protect the rights of individuals, as
criminal charges against an organization inevitably affect the individuals who
own or participate in the organization.
C. Possible Solutions to the Dilemma of Organizational Jury Rights
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts faced with
determining when an organization is entitled to a jury trial have employed two
tests: the case-by-case approach, which considers seriousness from the
organization's perspective, and the bright-line approach, which considers
seriousness from an objective standpoint. Although courts seem to favor the
case-by-case approach, the bright-line approach may be superior: it is easier to
apply and closely resembles the Court's six-month rule for deciding when
individuals are entitled to a jury.
i. The Case-by-Case Approach
The leading example of the case-by-case approach is United States v. Troxler
Hosiery Co.,'66 which held that the seriousness of the crime should be based in
part on the defendant organization's assets. The Fourth Circuit invoked the
Supreme Court's decision in Muniz that a $1o,ooo fine, although "serious"
under the statute, was insufficient to trigger a right to a jury trial given that the
defendant was a large union. The court read Muniz to require "that the right to
a jury trial be gauged, somehow, according to the ratio of the fine imposed and
the defendant's ability to pay. ' ' ,67 Thus, it suggested that an organization has a
right to a jury when the fine becomes "of such magnitude as to constitute a
164. See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
165. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) ("A right to jury trial is granted to criminal
defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.").
166. 681 F.2d 934 (4 th Cir. 1982). Although Troxier Hosiery concerned sentencing for contempt,
the court's language suggests that the decision applies to organizational sentencing more
broadly. Id.
167. Id. at 936 n.2.
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serious deprivation" for the defendant. 68 To decide whether the threatened
fine of $80,000 would impose a serious deprivation, the court looked at the
steps the defendant (with a net worth of $540,000) would have to take to
acquire the necessary cash, and it concluded that the fine was not so serious as
to require a jury trial.16 9
Other courts have also adopted the case-by-case approach. Notably, in
United States v. NYNEX Corp., the District Court for the District of Columbia
held that a potential $1 million fine was not serious enough to implicate the
Sixth Amendment because "[s] uch a fine is simply not serious to a corporation
of NYNEX's magnitude. A $1,ooo,ooo fine would, for example, constitute
one-tenth of one percent of NYNEX's average annual net income of over $1
billion." 7 ° Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Yang considered the
threatened fine in light of the organization's assets, liabilities, ownership
structure, and net annual profit to determine whether the organization was
entitled to a jury.17 The court emphasized that the defendant was a closely held
corporation and that the threatened $2 million fine would be more than twenty
times its annual net profit. The high fine thus rendered the crime serious
enough to entitle the corporation to a jury.17 2
The best argument for the case-by-case approach is the Supreme Court's
decision in Muniz. Although Muniz does not explicitly endorse this approach,
it implies that a judge must consider the nature and size of the defendant
organization when determining whether the charged offense is serious. 3 This
approach also has certain practical advantages. It better accounts for the great
variety in organization size and type than would a predetermined petty/serious
cut-off: for example, a $1oo,ool fine might be negligible for a large
multinational but catastrophic for a mom-and-pop. '74 More prosaically, the
case-by-case approach avoids the periodic need to adjust a fine threshold for
inflation.
1 7 s
168. Id. at 937.
169. Id. at 937-38.
170. 781 F. Supp. 19, 27 (D.D.C. 1991).
171. 144 F. App'x 521, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 31-32
(summarizing Yang).
172. Yang, 144 F. App'x at 523-24.
173. 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (reasoning that the "circumstances" of the organization may be
relevant to whether it is entitled to a jury).
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Yet this approach also has its problems. Its flexibility clashes with the
Court's six-month bright-line approach to individual jury rights. It could also
mire courts in complicated efforts to determine an organization's size and
assets. And, perhaps most importantly, it could foster disparity among lower
courts about an important constitutional right, thereby inviting unproductive
litigation.
2. The Bright-Line Approach
The primary example of a bright-line approach to organizational jury rights
is United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., in which the Second Circuit
held that an organization is entitled to a jury trial whenever it faces a penalty
exceeding $ioo,ooo. '76 For fines of $1oo,ooo or less, the court indicated that it
would "remain appropriate to consider whether the fine has such a significant
financial impact upon a particular organization as to indicate that the
punishment is for a serious offense, requiring a jury trial."'77 This system, the
court argued,
keeps faith with the core principle .. that the substantiality of the...
penalty determines the availability of the right to a jury.... [A] large
fine is a punishment of significance, and at some point the amount of a
fine indicates that an offense is serious, no matter how substantial the
financial reserves of the contemnor.178
In other words, the Second Circuit reasoned that the seriousness of the
organizational fine should be assessed objectively, not from the defendant's
perspective.
When deciding upon the seriousness threshold, the court began with
$500,000 179 _ the lowest statutory maximum that an organization charged with
a felony could face-and concluded that "some significant portion of this figure
is the appropriate threshold for determining an organization's right to a jury
trial. ''18° It settled on $1oo,ooo."'
176. 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1989). Although the language of Fox Film applies generally, its
holding is limited to criminal contempt cases. Id. at 661-65.
17. Id. at 665.
178. Id. at 664.
179. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000), the statutory maximum fine for a felony committed by an
organization is always $500,000 but may be higher.
18o. Fox Film, 882 F.2d at 665.
181. Id.
657
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The $1OO,OOO threshold has an additional logic, though the court did not
mention it in Fox Film. As discussed, an individual is entitled to a jury trial
whenever he faces a possible sentence of more than six months.182 Because the
maximum prison sentence for any class of misdemeanor is one year,'13 the
petty/serious cut-off for imprisonment is one-half of the maximum
misdemeanor sentence. Notably, the baseline statutory maximum faced by an
organization charged with a class A misdemeanor not resulting in death is
$200,000. 84 Thus, Fox Film's $1oo,ooo line, like the six-month line, is half of
the typical maximum misdemeanor sentence.
Fox Film's $1oo,ooo bright-line approach, therefore, nicely parallels the
court's six month bright-line rule, even if it does depart somewhat from
Muniz's focus on the impact of the fine on a particular defendant. It also
relieves courts of the administrative burden of determining how "serious" the
fine would be to the particular organization, at least for the large percentage of
cases in which the potential fine is above $loo,ooo.85
One potential disadvantage of the bright-line approach is that huge
corporations facing what are only moderate fines compared to their net worth
would always have a right to a jury trial, while smaller organizations would
have to undergo the case-by-case analysis. This state of affairs, however, might
not be as unjust as it may appear at first glance. A prominent corporation
charged with criminal activity will often face damage to its reputation far more
costly than any fine8 6: share prices drop, creditors become wary, and
customers lose goodwill. Thus, a criminal charge may be "serious" even when
the threatened fine would not be a blip in the corporation's balance book, as
long as the alleged crime is significant enough to attract public attention. If this
is so, a single bright-line standard that does not distinguish between large and
small firms might be preferable. In addition, the bright-line approach would
still provide for a factual inquiry into whether fines of $1oo,ooo or less were
serious in the particular case, allowing courts to account for the impact of such
fines on more modest organizations.
In summary, neither approach to organizational jury rights is flawless. The
case-by-case approach has greater support in the case law, but the bright-line
182. See supra text accompanying notes 142-150 (discussing the development of this six-month
rule).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6).
184. Id. § 3571(c)(5). As with a felony, this penalty can be increased to the maximum provided by
the statute setting forth the offense, or to twice the gain or loss caused by the offense. Id.
185. The defendant always faces a potential fine above $ioo,ooo when charged with a felony or
class A misdemeanor. Id. § 3571.
186. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 279.
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approach is easier for courts to administer and for businesses to understand,
and it provides a more objective and consistent means of gauging the
seriousness of a crime. For these reasons, the bright-line approach appears to
be the better of the two, even if it has not seen much use in the courts.
IV. BOOKER AND THE FUTURE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
GUIDELINES
This Part considers the full implications of Booker for the organizational
guidelines and argues that the guidelines, in their current form, cannot and
should not be made mandatory.
A. Can the Organizational Guidelines Be Mandatory After Booker?
Today, Congress and legal commentators are considering a variety of
means by which to circumvent Booker and restore mandatory sentencing
guidelines. '87 The two primary avenues for achieving such a restoration are
judicial and legislative. Neither the courts nor Congress, however, will find an
easy fix. Any attempt to make the guidelines mandatory again -consistent with
Booker-would be at best highly impractical, and perhaps impossible.
When sentencing organizations, a judge might increase the weight she
gives to the organizational guidelines, making them effectively mandatory.
After all, judges still must take the guidelines into account when sentencing, 188
and some courts have declared that the sentencing guidelines should carry
more weight than other sentencing factors. 8 ' A judge might suggest that
making the guidelines "effectively mandatory" is appropriate because Booker
addressed only individual defendants and because Congress sought to make
the guidelines binding to the fullest extent that the Constitution permits.
This approach has two potential problems. First, as previously established,
both Booker's constitutional holding and its statutory remedy apply to the
organizational guidelines. Second, applying the organizational guidelines as if
they were mandatory likely violates congressional intent, at least as understood
in Booker. Indeed, the Court emphasized that "a mandatory system in some
187. See, e.g., Booker Hearing, supra note 33 (statement of William W. Mercer).
188. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) ("The district courts, while not bound
to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.").
189. See, e.g., United States v. Jim~nez-Beltre, 44o F. 3 d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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cases and a nonmandatory system in others" would be inconsistent with
congressional intent. 9 '
Instead, one might argue that restoration of the guidelines to mandatory
status could only properly occur by congressional statute. For example,
Congress could reenact § 3553(b)(1) but limit its application to the
organizational guidelines. 9 ' This approach, however, would not be
constitutional because Booker's reasoning applies to the organizational
guidelines with the same force that it applies to the individual guidelines, at
least in the vast majority of cases. When sentencing organizations, judges
frequently find the facts- such as the loss caused by the crime and the level of
involvement of upper-level personnel-that determine both the base fine and
culpability score of the defendant, factors that ultimately determine the
possible sentences.92 If the organizational guidelines were mandatory,
whenever the organization was entitled to a jury trial, judge-found facts could
increase the potential sentence, in violation of the Constitution.
Under either the bright-line or the case-by-case approach, the vast majority
of organizations sentenced under the guidelines would be entitled to a jury trial.
Fox Film '93 holds that all organizations facing a potential fine of more than
$1oo,ooo are entitled to a jury. Yet every organization sentenced under the
guidelines faces a potential fine above $oo,ooo: the guidelines apply only to
organizations convicted of a felony or class A misdemeanor, 94 who therefore
face a statutory maximum fine of at least $2oo,ooo.' 9 Thus, under the bright-
line approach, every organization sentenced under the guidelines has a right to
a jury, and mandatory application of the organizational guidelines would
violate the organization's Sixth Amendment rights.' 96
19o. Booker, 543 U.S. at 266-67.
191. Congress might also restore the guidelines to mandatory status by altering them so that they
would rely solely on facts found by juries (or admitted by the defendant in a plea
agreement) rather than on facts found by judges, thereby providing defendants with their
full right to a jury trial. The Booker majority, however, rejected such a system for individual
defendants as "troubling," id. at 256, and "far more complex than Congress could have
intended," id. at 254; see id. at 252-58.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
193. United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1989); see
also supra text accompanying notes 176-184 (discussing Fox Film and the bright-line
approach).
194. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.9 (2005); see also supra text accompanying note
99-
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(5) (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
196. Although Fox Film's $1oo,ooo bright line is the only line proposed by a federal court, the
bright line could perhaps be drawn at a higher level -say, $1 million. With a $1 million
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The case-by-case approach is more amenable to mandatory organizational
guidelines than the bright-line approach, but not by much. As discussed in
Muniz, Troxier Hosiery, NYNEX, and Yang, this approach requires courts to
make some comparison between the size of the potential fine and the
organization's assets and ability to pay.197 Thus, a court may deny a jury trial to
an organization facing a significant fine when that fine is not "serious" because
the defendant is a large, wealthy orgaizaton.' In reality, however, very few
organizations sentenced under the guidelines have the financial resources of a
corporation like NYNEX. The vast majority of sentenced organizations are
small, closely held corporations with limited assets1 99 and are often unable to
pay the fine imposed.2° Thus, even under the case-by-case approach, Congress
could only constitutionally reinstate the guidelines' mandatory status for a
small fraction of the organizations sentenced each year." 1
threshold, a significant fraction of defendants (perhaps a majority) would not automatically
be entitled to a jury. If these defendants were then denied jury trials, Congress could
perhaps reinstate mandatory organizational guidelines for a large fraction of defendants. No
one, however, has seriously suggested such a harsh rule, given that it would leave many
small firms facing a devastating fine without a right to a jury trial- almost certainly a Sixth
Amendment violation. Accordingly, Fox Film proposed evaluating defendants below the
bright line on a case-by-case basis, 882 F.2d at 665, a solution that any court using the
bright-line rule would be sure to adopt. Setting the bright line high enough would simply
cause the bright-line approach to break down into the case-by-case approach.
197. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975); United States v. Yang, 144 F. App'x 521 (6th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Troxier Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. NYNEX Corp., 781 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1991); see also supra notes 166-175 and
accompanying text (examining the case-by-case approach).
198. See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477; Yang, 144 F. App'x 521; Troxier Hosiery, 681 F.2d 934; NYNEX,
781 F. Supp. 19.
199. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 26; see also supra text accompanying notes 94-98
(describing the characteristics of organizations sentenced under the guidelines).
2oo. In fiscal year 2005, for instance, over 30% of organizations had their sentences reduced
because of an inability to pay. 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 125 tbl.5 3 (pre-Booker
statistics); id. at 343 tbl. 5 3 (post-Booker statistics).
2ol. Even if Congress leaves the organizational guidelines in their present nonmandatory state,
they still may run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. See Phillip C. Zane, Booker Unbound: How
the New Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence Affects Deterring and Punishing Major Financial Crimes
and What To Do About It, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 263 (2005). Courts are authorized to sentence
organizations convicted of a felony up to the greatest of: (1) the maximum fine in the statute
setting forth the offense, (2) $500,000, and (3) twice the gain or loss caused by the crime. 18
U.S.C. § 3 57 1(c)-(d) (2000). For especially harmful crimes, the fine recommended by the
organizational guidelines often exceeds both $5oo,ooo and the maximum in the statute
setting forth the offense. See Zane, supra, at 264. Thus, for a court to impose this fine, it
must first make the factual finding that the fine is no greater than twice the gain or loss
caused by the crime, in violation of the Apprendi rule.
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B. Should the Organizational Guidelines Be Mandatory After Booker?
Even if the organizational guidelines could be made mandatory again
consistent with Booker's holding, they should not be. First, the organizational
guidelines' fine levels possess only the scantest legal, normative, empirical, or
historical support. During the drafting process, the Commission used then-
statutory maximums to set a few low and high base fines.2"' It then set the base
fines for other offense levels by extrapolation, using what limited historical
data it had" 3 along with the sentencing patterns for individuals. 0 4 The
Commission decided what factors should be considered in sentencing and
what multiplier levels were appropriate using a combination of past data,
practical insight, and informed judgment°5 -in other words, enlightened
guesswork.
Moreover, recall that the Commission's concerns about its own ability to
set appropriate fine levels led it to exclude certain offenses, such as
environmental and food and drug crimes, from the guidelines' fine system
entirely.Y,6 The same concerns would suggest that judges should maintain
some freedom to depart from the guidelines' fines, especially given the variety
and complexity of organizational cases. As an added benefit, allowing judges
the flexibility to depart from the guidelines as necessary in particular cases
would signal to the Commission which guideline provisions are in need of
revision.°
7
Three basic arguments are offered for making the organizational guidelines
binding -justifications very similar to those for making the individual
guidelines mandatory. First, courts are too soft on white-collar and corporate
crime, and mandatory guidelines are necessary to increase penalties and ensure
zo2. For example, the Commission set the lowest base fine (offense level six and below) at $5000
because, absent any aggravating or mitigating factors, this baseline would yield a sentencing
range of $5ooo to $io,ooo, and $io,ooo is the maximum fine that can be imposed for most
class B misdemeanors. Supp. REPORT, supra note 45, at 13.
203. See id. at 2; see also Cohen, supra note 52, at 253-64 (providing data on monetary sanctions
for convicted organizations from 1984-1987, 1988, and 199o).
2o4. See SuPP. REPORT, supra note 45, at 7, 10, 13.
2os. Id. at io; Nagel & Swenson, supra note 65, at 225-26. For an especially harsh critique of the
"arbitrary" nature of the organizational guidelines, see Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without... :
Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q 397
(1993).
2o6. SUPP. REPORT, supra note 45, at 7-8; see also supra notes ioo-loi and accompanying text.
207. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.i cmt. background (2005) (providing the
original introduction to the sentencing guidelines and describing departure as a means by
which the guidelines should evolve).
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that corporate criminals are appropriately punished. Second, mandatory
guidelines are necessary to reduce disparity in sentencing. Third, mandatory
guidelines are necessary to give organizations incentives to create compliance
programs.2" 8 Each of these arguments is unconvincing.
Although organizational penalties have increased drastically since the
organizational guidelines were introduced,2"9  this increase cannot be
exclusively attributed to the guidelines' binding character. Indeed,
organizational sentencing levels had been increasing before the guidelines were
adopted," ° and the post-guidelines increase might have been caused by any
number of factors, such as more harmful organizational crime, increased
prosecution of white-collar crimes, or a greater willingness by judges to impose
harsh sentences. Unfortunately, the data are too spotty to allow any strong
conclusions,'1 and studies have reached different results. One study of data
from 1987 through 1995 found that the guidelines had "no significant effect on
the levels or structure of corporate monetary sanctions actually imposed, after
controlling for the harm attributed to the offense .... In contrast, another study
on publicly traded firms sentenced during roughly the same period concluded
that, controlling for both crime severity and case type, the guidelines had
significantly increased criminal fines.2"3
This second study also found, however, that while total sanctions had
increased, the guidelines were not responsible for all of the increase." 4 This
finding suggested two additional conclusions. First, other factors (for which
the study had not controlled) might well have been driving the increase in
sanctions: for example, judges might have been cooperating with the
movement toward higher sanctions even when the guidelines' fines did not
2o8. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
2o9. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
211. See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 25 ("The data [do] not provide an adequate basis for
identifying trends because the sample sizes are generally small, the fine guidelines are not
applicable in many cases, and the Commission does not receive data on every organizational
case sentenced.").
212. Jeffrey S. Parker & Raymond A. Atkins, Did the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines Matter? Some
Preliminary Empirical Observations, 42 J.L. & ECON. 423, 424 (1999).
213. Cindy R. Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the
Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 418 (1999) [hereinafter Alexander et al.,
Criminal Sanctions]; see also Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Eftect of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines on Penalties Jbr Public Corporations, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 20 (1999) (noting an
apparent increase in organizational sentences).
214. Alexander et al., Criminal Sanctions, supra note 213, at 415.
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apply.21 Second, in cases in which guideline fines were mandatory, judges
might have responded by decreasing non-fine sanctions. In other words,
whenever the guidelines required a higher fine than a judge thought
appropriate, he might compensate by reducing the required amount of
restitution or other remedies.216 Thus, the example that the organizational
guidelines set, not their binding status, may have driven the increase.
Second, there is no indication that mandatory guidelines reduce
organizational sentencing disparity. A recent study relying on data from 1991
to 2001 found a good deal of unexplained variance in organizational sentences,
leading the authors to conclude that significant disparity haunted
organizational sentencing even under the mandatory guidelines." 7 The authors
were not able to determine whether the sentencing disparity was less than
before the organizational guidelines were created-that is, whether the
guidelines were of any use in decreasing disparity. Moreover, the apparent
similarity between guideline and non-guideline organizational sentences218
suggests that if there is disparity in organizational sentencing, mandatory
guidelines do little to correct it. As noted, the total sanctions judges impose on
convicted organizations are roughly in accordance with the organizational
guidelines even when the guidelines' fine levels do not apply. 9 Thus, judges
appear to reach roughly the same sentences regardless of whether the
organizational guidelines are mandatory or advisory: if the guidelines do
reduce disparity in sentencing, they need not be mandatory to accomplish this
reduction.
Finally, mandatory organizational guidelines are not needed to induce
organizations to create compliance programs. Since the organizational
guidelines' creation, only three organizations have had their sentences reduced
for compliance,"' perhaps because the Department of Justice restricts
prosecution largely to organizations without effective compliance programs. 2 '
215. Id.
216. Id. at 414-15.
217. See Piquero & Davis, supra note 98, at 652. The authors took into account a wide variety of
legal and extralegal variables, including the relevant base fine, the organization's tolerance of
misconduct, the size of the organization, prior misconduct, the organization's solvency, its
ownership structure, and whether it had a compliance program. See id. at 646-50.
218. See supra text accompanying note 214.
219. Alexander et al., Criminal Sanctions, supra note 213, at 415; see also supra text accompanying
notes 214-216.
22o. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 26.
z2. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has incorporated the guidelines' compliance standards
into its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, used by the DOJ and U.S.
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Corporate directors, therefore, adopt compliance programs primarily to
prevent the government from prosecuting the corporation22 and to prevent
themselves from becoming civilly liable to their shareholders." 3 These
incentives to maintain compliance programs do not evaporate with the shift to
advisory guidelines.
Thus, the complexity of organizational crime and the artificiality of the
organizational guidelines' fine levels counsel strongly in favor of allowing
judges some flexibility in setting fines, and no convincing rationale exists for
denying them such flexibility. Indeed, some evidence suggests that when
judges are denied flexibility in setting organizational fines, they simply
compensate by adjusting the non-fine sanctions, such as the amount of
restitution required.2 4 Congress, the Commission, and the courts should not
go searching for ways to make the organizational guidelines mandatory again;
they are best left advisory.
CONCLUSION
Booker severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3 553 (b)(i), the provision that made
all of the sentencing guidelines mandatory. Its holding clearly applies to the
organizational guidelines and therefore rendered them nonmandatory as well.
After Booker, Congress, lower federal courts, and the Sentencing Commission
cannot make the organizational guidelines, as currently drafted, mandatory
again. The vast majority of organizations sentenced under the guidelines are
small. The potential fines they face are large and, hence, serious. Most, if not
all, of these organizations are entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth
Attorneys to decide whether or not to charge an organization with the crimes of its agents.
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components, U.S. Attorneys 3, 8-9, 1O & n.6, ii (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj .gov/dag/cftf/business-organizations.pdf.
222. See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 68, at 27 (identifying "lenient treatment under government
policies" as the primary benefit of a compliance program).
223. Corporate directors who fail to create a compliance program may have breached their duty
of care if the lack of a program leads to prosecution or a higher fine. This possibility was
established by In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996). In Caremark, Chancellor Allen noted that the "Guidelines offer powerful incentives
for corporations today to have in place compliance programs." Id. at 969. Directors who
ignored these incentives would put their corporation at risk of high criminal fines and
assorted other costs. Thus, Chancellor Allen concluded that a duty to create a compliance
system is part of the duty of care. Id. at 970.
224. See, e.g., Alexander et al., Criminal Sanctions, supra note 213, at 414-15; see also supra text
accompanying notes 214-216.
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Amendment, and Booker prohibits courts from sentencing them using
mandatory guidelines together with judge-found facts.
Yet even if some sentenced organizations do not have a jury right, Congress
and the courts should keep the organizational guidelines advisory.
Organizational sentencing is complex and calls for judicial flexibility. The
purposes of organizational sentencing are best served if judges can depart from
the guidelines' recommendations when those recommendations would be
inappropriate in the particular case. Booker provides courts with this pragmatic
flexibility, and neither Congress nor the courts should eliminate it.
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